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CHAPTER IX
Macroeconomic Effects of the Trade Regime
During the 1950—1970 period, Turkey's growth rate was well above the
average for all LDCs. Despite year-to-year fluctuations and changes in the
growth rate between various subperiods, the average annual rate of growth
was a healthy 5.7 per cent. Even so, Turkey's per capita income in 1970 was
the lowest in Europe. All Turkish governments since 1950 have mad&a rapid
increase in per capita income a major goal.
Not only was Turkey's per capita income low relative to that of her
European neighbors, but as experience with planning progressed in the
1960's, bottlenecks to growth appeared: foreign exchange shortage and in-
adequate savings and capital formation were the most prominent.1 In addi-
tion, discussion about the conflict between employment creation and growth
began toward the end of the
Despite Turkey's relatively favorable growth rate, a natural question is
how much more rapid growth might have been. In terms of this study, the
question can be formulated in terms of a consideration of Turkish growth
under the quantitative-restriction, import-substitution regime compared with
the growth that could have been achieved under alternative policies.
Estimates are made in this chapter of the losses in the manufacturing
sector incurred in the 1960's by overemphasis upon import-substitution. It is
shown that alternative strategies could have resulted in significant increases in
the rate of growth of manufacturing output and value-added at both Turkish
and international prices, reduced import requirements for both new invest-
ment and for intermediate goods, a reduced incremental capital-output ratio,
and greatly increased employment opportunities for the same level of invest-
ment. Section I describes the method of analysis and Section II provides the
results.
Mention should first be made of the experience of the 1950's. The fact
that the focus is upon the 1960's does not imply that the trade regime did
not incur sizeable costs in the 1950's. On the contrary, they were probably
greater.
Data for the 1950's are inadequate to attempt to estimate the growth-rate
costs of the regime in a manner comparable to that undertaken here for the
1. SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I), pp. 46-7.
2. See the papers in Miller (ed.), op. cit. (Note 12, Chap. VIII).Resource Allocational and Growth E4
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Source:For 1951—1968: Fry,op. cit. (Note 30, Chap. lI),p. 30. For 1968—1971: Fry,
"Reply," Economic Journal, June 1972.
1960's. Fortunately Fry has already derived some important empirical rela-
tionships at art aggregate level, and his results are significant in the present
context.
Using five-year moving averages of investment and GNP Fry calculated
investment as a fraction of GNP, the fractions of public and private invest-
ment in total investment, and the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR).
He then tested two hypotheses: (1) changes in the rate of growth of GNP (at
1961 prices) are explicable in terms of changes in the investment-GNP ratio
and its composition between public and private investment; and (2) there was
a significant difference in the growth rate between the 1950's and the 1960's.
Fry's data are reproduced in Table IX-l. The ICOR rose steadily until
1954—1958, fell sharply in 1955—1959 and 1956—1960, reattained its peak
in 1957—1961 and 1958—1962, and thereafter declined until 1962—1966,
rising gradually again in the late 1960's. By contrast, investment as a fraction
of GNP rose fairly steadily throughout the two-decade period.
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No significant changes occured in the trends in total, public and private investment as
proportions of GNP...There was a highly significant change in the trend in GNP itself
measured at 1961 prices...3
Thus changes in the ratio of investment to GNP do not explain the changes in
the growth rate over the period. Using the Chow test, Fry found that there
was a highly significant difference between the 1950's and the 1960's. He
dates the point of the changes as 1957—1961 and concludes that the change
wouldseemto have been a result of a change in the incremental capital-output
ratio (and not in the trend in the proportion of investment to GNP).4
Fry attributes the significant change in the growth rate to a reduction in
the ICOR. Since 1961 was the year of the altered structural relationships-i Fry
concluded that the change can be attributed to the onset of planning. Two
questions arise with respect to that diagnosis: (1) planning did not take effect
until 1963 and there were undoubtedly lags before it could affect the growth
rate; and (2) the ICORs are moving averages, reflecting events of earlier as
well as terminal years. Since the change in the real exchange rate and the
reduction of inflation preceded the start of planning, it seems reasonable to
attribute some part of the change to those events. It is difficult to isolate the
effects of the trade regime in the 1950's from those of inflation. Even so it
can be argued that the resource misallocational and growth effects of infla-
tion were felt primarily through their effects on Turkish trade and payments.
Certainly a very high fraction of the effects of policies in the 1950's was
attributable to the trade regime and its consequences, as Turkey was heavily
dependent upon trade and the effects of the deterioration in her payments
position were severe.
Although Fry's finding of significant structural change at the point 1957—
1961 is highly suggestive, it is by no means conclusive. Alternative efforts to
measure the effects of trade policies on growth in the 1950's are thwarted by
lack of data. We then turn to the 1960's.
I. Estimating alternative growth patterns
It is always difficult to provide quantitative estimates of the changes that
would have occurred under different alternatives, and more so when discuss-
ing alternative growth patterns. One means of doing so would be to provide a
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fully specified model of the structural relations in the Turkish economy.5
However, not only are the data lacking to accomplish such a task, but the
sorts of policy alternatives we wish to consider —amore liberal trade regime,
equalized incentives for export promotion and import•substitution, and an
export-oriented growth strategy —areso far outside the range of observations
on the Turkish economy that one would have little confidence in the result-
ing estimates even if data were available.
A significant change in incentives would obviously have a large number of
effects. As seen in Chapter VIII, many firms would either increase
their efficiency or would contract, so that some excess costs of production
would be eliminated for all firms. As a consequence the capital and labor
coefficients for individual sectors would alter. Greater competition might lead
to yet further changes. And the mix of products within industries would
undoubtedly alter, with the relative importance of various sectors also shift-
ing.
Not all of these effects can be estimated, and yet they may be very
important. Here we content ourselves with a simpler approach which can
provide insights into possible orders of magnitude on inter-industry shifts,
although there is no basis for estimating changes in coefficients for individual
industries that might occur. To limit the analysis still further, we focus only
on manufacturing and shifts within it that might have arisen under alternative
policies.
Before providing details of the method of estimation, it will help the
reader to have an overview. The procedure essentially amounts to comparing
planned manufacturing investment and growth with what would have happen-
ed under alternative allocations of the same total investment in
ing. The alternative allocations are hypothetical and designed to approximate
what might have happened had growth been oriented somewhat less toward
import-substitution and if approximately equal incentives had been given for
the development of manufactured exports and import-substitution.
The analysis is restricted to manufacturing industries for several reasons.
Under any conceivable growth strategy, manufacturing would be the leading
growth sector. Given this fact, a strategy entailing less emphasis upon import-
substitution would necessarily imply development of manufactured exports.
Rapid growth of manufacturing appears to have been a goal of economic
policy, so that it would make little sense to examine a strategy that placed
5. There are several dynamic planning models for Turkey but they are not suitable for
analysis of the kinds of questions posed here. See Charles Blitzer, l-likmet çetin and
Alan Manne, "A Dynamic Five Sector Model for Turkey, 1967—82," American Eco-
nomic Review, May 1970; and Charles Blitzer, A Perspective Planning Model for
Turkey: 1969—1984, Stanford University Research Center in Economic Growth,
mimeograph, August 1971.
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less emphasis upon manufacturing growth. An alternative growth strategy
would undoubtedly have resulted in considerable expansion of non-manufac-
tured minor and traditional exports, such as lumber and livestock. Analysis of
the potential of these factors would require detailed study of each sector in
Turkey, as well as of export markets. Markets have been shown to exist for
Turkish manufacturing and data are available, and Turkey's manufactured
exports generally constitute negligible fractions of their world markets. Final-
ly, inspection of the manufacturing sector alone provides very conservative
estimates of what could have been achieved under alternative growth pat-
terns, especially since parameters for individual industries are assumed un-
changed.
The assumption that manufacturing investment would have been the same
with no change in investments in other sectors implies that the use of infra-
structure —electricity,transport, and so on— would have been the same under
each pattern of manufacturing growth. To the extent that import-substituting
industries actually had higher (or lower) infrastructural requirements than
other manufacturing industries, the estimates of the adverse growth-rate ef-
fects of the import-substituting pattern will be understated (or overstated).
Identification of investment patterns under alternative growth strategies
The important question in the absence of a structural model is the identifi-
cation of investment allocations that would have corresponded to different
growth strategies. We seek to estimate what would have happened had growth
been less import-substitution oriented and had incentives to manufacture for
export been equal.
The main question is, what would have been "reasonable" allocation pat-
terns in contrast to that which actually prevailed? Attempting to identify
potential export sectors and quantifying the amount by which they might
have grown would be the best way of reaching an answer to this question, if
there were a sound scientific means of identification and quantification.6
Most such means, however, contain a large arbitrary and subjective element.
Two significant facts provide a way out of the impasse. First, import-substitu-
tion sectors were generally allocated a much higher share of new investment
than their share of existing capital, value-added, and output. Although every
manufacturing sector clearly has both potential export- and import-competing
sectors, a strategy oriented less toward import-substitution would surely have
6. Consideration was given to estimating sectoral DRCs and maximizing international
value-added from new manufacturing output subject to the volume of investment
actually undertaken and the availability of foreign exchange for capital goods and for
intermediate-goods imports. Neither foreign exchange constraint was binding and thus
all investment was allocated to one sector, a clearly unsatisfactory solution.Macroeconomic Effects of the Trade Regime
allocated more new investment to the established sectors and less to the
newer industries. Second, the import-substitution sectors generally had higher
ICORsthanthe established industries.
These two considerations enable identification of plausible alternative
investment patterns: (1) a strategy oriented less toward import-substitution
would have been one where each sector was allocated new investment in
proportion to its share of the initial manufacturing capital stock; and (2) each
sector would be allocated new investment in proportion to its initial share of
domestic manufacturing value-added. By using a base year (1963) when con-
siderable import-substitution had already occurred, the allocation of new
investment according to share in capital stock corresponds to a growth strat-
egy less heavily oriented toward import-substitution than the actual, although
considerable further import-substitution would still have occurred. That pat.
tern will be described as "moderate import-substitution" (MIS). Allocation
of new investment in accordance with value-added shares would have resulted
iti some iniport.substitution growth but less than MIS. It thus approximates
what might have happened had incentives been equalized for export promo-
tion and import substitution. This will be called "balanced export promotion
and import substitution" (BEPIM).
The two growth alternatives represent identifiable allocation patterns.
They both give heavier weight than the Plans did to those industries where
Turkey apparently has the greater comparative advantage. Both patterns im-
ply at least as rapid a growth of the overall manufacturing sector as was
envisaged by the policy makers. Thus if the hypothetical alternatives had
enabled more rapid growth of manufacturing, income, and employment,
those alternatives would presumably have been preferred to the actual pattern,
oriented toward import-substitution. Several questions are relevant: Taking
the amount of investment in manufacturing as given, how did the rate of
growth of manufacturing value-added compare with that which would have
occurred under MIS or BEPIM with the same total investment, when value-
added is evaluated at Turkish prices? Further, how does the actual growth
rate compare with that which would have been experienced under the two
alternatives evaluated at world prices? Then, what would have been the im-
port content of investment and how does that compare with the actual im-
port content? What would intermediate goods imports have been, compared
to what they actually were? What would the ICOR in manufacturing have been,
compared to what it actually was? And what would employment in manufac-
turing have been?
Method of estimation
The basic observed variables, considered as equal under the planned
growth pattern and the two alternatives, are as follows:
250 Resource Allocational and Growth
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Once solutions are found for (7) and (8), eq. (1) through (6) can be solved for
the outcome under planned investment and the two hypothetical alternatives.
But first, the sources of data and their reliability must be examined.
The data
It was decided to estimate the effects of alternative investment allocations
for two separate time periods: the 1963-to-1967 period, corresponding to the
FFYP; and the 1967-to-1972 period, corresponding to the SFYP. The basic
data for each period were taken, insofar as possible, from the respective Plans,
and the partitioning of manufacturing into subsectors followed that in each
of the Plans.
A key problem was that of obtaining internally consistent estimates of the
various parameters. At first it was thought that the ICORs implied in the
Plans could be combined with actual investment and output data. But prices
had changed, and the data were noncomparable in several other regards. It
was therefore decided to utilize all data implicit in the FFYP and SFYP,
treating the projected outputs in the Plans as the actual outputs. Thus all
three patterns could be estimated, using the same parameters as actually used
by the planners. The implied ICORs were derived by taking Plan estimates of
investment and value-added changes between the base and terminal year. By
using a five-year period as the basis of observation it was hoped that the
effects of differences in timing of investments upon the observed changes in
value-added would be minimized. These same ICORs were used for estimation
of the attained rate of growth (really the planned rate of growth) and for the
two alternative allocations. The ratios of value-added to output at Turkish
prices were also implicit in the Plan documents and these were used in all sets
of estimates. To the extent that the planners underestimated the costs of
import-substitution, that bias is also contained in the results below.
Four needed parameters were not available from the Plans. These were
employment per unit of output, import coefficients per unit of investment,
import coefficients per unit of output, and the ratio of domestic value-added
to international value-added.
Two sources were used to obtain import coefficients: (1) data on sectoral
intermediate goods imports per unit of output were taken from the 1967
input-output table; and (2) data on import requirements per unit of invest-
ment in each sector were derived from the 1964 Census of Manufacturing
Industries.7 These data were the only ones available in both cases, and were
7. The Census of Manufacturing Industries provided data on gross additions to fixed
assets during 1963, and the value of imported goods in machinery and equipment
acquisitions. The ratio of imported machinery to total investment in buildings and
plant and equipment was used.Effectsof theTrade Regime
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assumed constant between the PFYP and SFYP. Employment coefficients
were also obtained from the Census of Manufactures.
The most- difficult estimates to obtain were coefficients linking Turkish
value-added per unit of output to international value-added per unit of out-
put. The procedure finally adopted was to use data from özfirat's study8 for
those sectors for which they were available, and to estimate an unweighted
average of available estimates for those sectors for which did not
provide data. As seen in Chapter VIII, Ozfirat's data probably underestimated
the differences in the ratio of international to domestic value-added between
the export and import-substituting sectors. As such, there is probably a down-
ward bias in the estimate of the difference in international value-added that
would have resulted under alternative strategies.
In general, estimates of the differences in growth rates between the alter-
native allocations are likely to be biased downward. Not only are they sector-
al aggregates, thereby obscuring the differences within sectors between ex-
port-oriented and import-substituting activities, but the coefficients of each
sector are assumed constant over the period of estimation. Any effects of the
trade regime in altering capital intensities or in increasing capital and labor
coefficients are obscured by the method of estimation.
Table IX-2 gives the coefficients used in the analysis. The first two col-
umns give the ratio of imports to investment and to production in each
sector. These coefficients were used for analysis of both Plan periods, al-
though the data on imports of capital goods for investment relate to 1963
and the intermediate-goods import coefficients are for 1967. The absence on
any alternative basis for estimating the coefficients for the periods separately
dictated this decision.
The third column of Table IX-2 gives the ratio of international value-added
to Turkish value-added in each sector. Again, these ratios were used for
analysis of both periods. It should be remembered that these coefficients, like
the import coefficients, obscure a great deal of intrasectoral variation. As
such, the resulting estimates of the growth rate effects of import-substitution
are undoubtedly underestimated, as the intrasectoral allocations tended
toward the high-cost, high-import-content subsectors.
The next two columns give the implied ICORs (increase in value-added at
Turkish prices per TL of investment in each sector) in the FFYP and SFYP.
As can be seen, there was considerable fluctuation between the two periods
and some coefficients are open to considerable question. Perhaps the most
suspect sectors are wood products and rubber products, where the change
between the two Plans is very great, and petroleum in the SFYP, where the
low capital-intensity of the sector appears completely implausible. The trans-
8.Ozfirat, op. cit. (Table VIH-1).1*
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Table IX-2
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Fur and kaliber products 0.35 30.123 0.881 n.a. 5.00047.53
Rubber products 0.531 0.4410.5640.891 2.415 56.33
Chemicals 0.6110.307 0.625 5.4952.659 28.74
Petroleum 0.847 0.15 1 0.721 n.a. 0.975 3.27
Non-metallic products 0.1730.072 0.813 1.381 1.11645.08
Basic metals 0.2100.064 0.555 3.8314.032 20.70
Metal products 0.0800.158 0.637 1.087 1.42036.57
Machinery 0.3090.309 0.412 1.279 1.297 19.44
Electrical machinery 0.2770.224 0.615 1.225 1.125 23.02
Transport equipment 0.0760.252 0.3240.6290.568 51.71
Miscellaneous manufacturing0.421 n.a. n.a. 0.289n.a. n.a.
Sources:n,'s from 1964 Census of Manufacturing Industries, computed as the ratio of
imported goods to total investment in each sector.
m1's from 1967 input-output table, kindly supplied by SF0. They are exclu.
sive of taxes paid on imports. IVA/DVA: all are from Ozfirat, op. cit. (Table
VIII-1), except fur and leather products, petroleum, metal products, machine-
ry, and transport equipment. The latter, except petroleum, are based on data
from the sources listed in Table V1II-1. The petroleum estimate was kindly
provided by industry sources in interviews.
ICOR's: calculated by taking the ratio of increment in value-added to five-
year investment in each Plan. FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap 1), tables 84—86,
pp. 185—6. SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. 1), tables 197, 199, pp. 405, 407.
e/'s: ratios of employment to value-added for firms with ten or more em-
ployees, from Census of Manufactures.
Notes:The footwear and wearing apparel, furniture and fixtures, and printing and
publishing sectors were included in the textile, wood products and paper
sectors respectively in the 1967 input-output table and by Ozfirat. Import
coefficients for intermediate goods and the ratio of IVA to DVA are therefore
the same for each pair of sectors.
In the SFYP, several sectors were disaggregated, and the subsector esti-
mates were used in the computations. The sectors, subsectors, and ICORs were:
Non-metallic products Ceramics 0.889
Glass 1.116
Cement 0.400
Metal products Non-ferrous-metal 1.605
Machinery Agricultural machinery0.769
Electrical machinery Electronics 0.937
The last three subsectors were calculated separately for the SFYP, with IVA/
DVA ratios of 0.623, 0.430, and 0.6 15, respectively.mic Effects of the Trade Regime
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port equipment ICOR also appears implausibly low, but the sector is domi.
nated by repair activities, which may explain it.
Despite the probable margins of error in the ICORs it was decided to use
all figures as given in the Plans, on the grounds that they were the data
actually used in deciding upon an import-substitution strategy and are at least
internally consistent. Selection of any alternative technique for estimation
involved the difficulty that constant-price estimates of actual investment and
output, by sectors, are simply unavailable. The bias that would be introduced
by use of current-price data or choice of sectoral deflators was judged to be
greater than any errors in the SPO data. It should be noted that the FFYP
data were in 1961 prices whereas the SFYP data were in 1965 prices. Insofar
as domestic prices of some sectoral outputs rose more rapidly than average, or
as the price of manufactured goods changed relative to the price of the
investment goods, the ICORs are noncomparable. Another factor, which in
the author's judgment is probably not important, is that the implicit ICORs
could have been influenced by the planned timing of investments within each
period.
Thus the data are at best indicative of orders of magnitude. While they are
undoubtedly subject to error there is little basis for believing that those errors
are systematic, except that intrasectoral differences are obscured. We turn to
consideration of alternative allocational patterns.
II. Growth under alternative allocations
Table IX-3 gives the actual investment allocation set forth in each Plan,
and the two hypothetical allocations. As is evident from the table, the degree
of disaggregation in the FFYP was considerably less than in the SFYP. Since
in each period the hypothetical allocational procedures allotted investments
in proportion to the sector's share of total manufacturing value-added or
capital stock, the SFYP allocation was influenced by the outcome of the
FFYP. The first and fourth columns of Table IX-3 give the actual planned
investments in each sector. The second and fifth columns give the amount of
the investment in each sector that would have resulted under the MIS
allocation.
The third and sixth columns give the investment allocation that would
have resulted had each sector been allocated a share of total investment (in
manufacturing) in proportion with its initial-year share, of manufacturing
value-added —i.e.,the export-oriented strategy implied by the BEPIM alloca-
tion. The sectors with below-average capital intensity receive a smaller alloca-
tion under the MIS allocation than under BEPIM. Thus food products and
textiles, both of which have capital intensities well below the average, wouldFirst Five Year Plan: Increase in























Source:Tables lX-2 and IX-3.
tors would have been consi
pattern. The MIS allocation
substitution could have
exports would have been av:
Several features of indh
portant, the implied ICOR
improbably low. Given th
added was already 8 per ce
would have exceeded plann
4 of Table IX-3) are taker
tobacco products are a larl
thetical allocations would
sector, given the probable
a scale.
We first consider the p
contrast it with the growt
strategies, at Turkish and
the FFYP and TableIX-5
256 MacroeconomicEffects of the Trade Regime
TableIX-3
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Source:Coefficients from Table IX-2. Actual investment allocations from FFYP and
SFYP, op. cit. (Notes 20, 21, Chap. I). Alternative allocations computed ac-
cording to eqs. (7) and (8).
have received a considerably larger investment allocation under BEPIM than
under MIS. Sectors such as chemicals, which are heavily capital-intensive,
would have received a considerably larger allocation under MIS than under
BEPIM.
Under either hypothetical allocation, investment in the "traditional" sec-nomic Effects of the Trade Regime
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First Five Year Plan: Increase in value-added at Turkish and international prices under
























FFYP MIS BEPIMFFYP MIS BEPIM
Food, beverages, and
tobacco 917 2027 3060 811 1792 2705
Textiles and clothing 840 1861 2924 591 1310 2058















Chemicals 499 320 99 312 200 62
Nonmetallic products 220 213 263 179 173 214
Basic metals 557 545 242 309 302 134
Metal products 219 427 668 139 272 425
Machinery 832 136 181 343 56 75
Electrical machinery 199 53 74 122 33 46
Transport equipment 671 83 224 217 27 73
Other 325 107 626 162 53 313
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tors would have been considerably greater than under the actual investment
pattern. The MIS allocation represents something of a halfway house: import-
substitution could have proceeded fairly rapidly, although some additional
exports would have been available from the traditional sectors.
Several features of individual sectors should be noted. Perhaps most im-
portant, the implied ICOR for the petroleum sector in the second Plan was
improbably low. Given that the oil sector's share in manufacturing value-
added was already 8 per cent in 1967, investment in petroleum under BEPIM
would have exceeded planned investment, if the figures for the latter (column
4 of Table IX-3) are taken as valid. At the opposite side of the spectrum,
tobacco products are a large manufacturing sector in Turkey, and the hypo-
thetical allocations would imply unrealistically high growth rates for that
sector, given the probable difficulties of developing an export market on such
a scale.
We first consider the planned growth of manufacturing value-added, and
contrast it with the growth that would have occurred under the alternative
strategies, at Turkish and international prices. Table IX-4 gives the data for
the FFYP and Table IX-5 gives the data for the SFYP. The first three col-
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Table IX-5
Second Five Year Plan: Increase in value-added, by sectors, at Turkish and international
prices, under alternative allocations of investment (increase from 1967 in millions of
1965 TL)
Value-added at Turkish Value-added at International
Sector Prices Prices
SFYP MIS BEPIMSFYP MIS BEPIM
Food 1170 2345 2558 1034 2073 2661
Beverages 150 318 .558 55 116 94
Tobacco 210 1115 2121 158 836 1590
Textiles and clothing 2000 2938 4225 1408 2068 2947
Wood products 280 434 477 241 374 411
Paper 180 130 22 105 76 13
Printing and publishing 150 174 225 87 101 131
Hides and leather 30 87 30 26 77 26
Rubber 290 391 279 164 221 157
Plastic 180 116 153 102 65 86
Chemicals 1600 753 489 1000 471 306
Petroleum 1180 1173 2076 850 846 1496
Ceramics 45 59 112 37 48 91
Glass 215 231 358 178 188 291
Cement 470 289 249 305 188 162
Cement and clay products150 260 1124 126 218 944
Iron and steel 1040 868 372 577 482 206
Nonferrous metals 280 318 103 174 198 64
Metal products 810 781 950 516 497 605
Machinery 1195 608 809 492 250 333
Agricultural machinery 195 130 292 84 56 126
Electrical machinery 400 217 333 246 133 205
Electronics 160 86 160 98 53 98
Road vehicles 616 477 1451 200 155 470
Railway vehicles 60 130 123 26 56 53
Shipbuilding 170 43 36 55 14 12
Total 13226 14471 19685 8340 9860 13578
Source:Tables lX-2 and IX-3.
umns in each table give the increase over the Plan period in domestic value-
added at domestic prices in manufacturing under the actual and two hypo-
thetical investment patterns. The last three columns give the increase in value-
added in manufacturing at international prices under each pattern.
Turning to Table 1X4 first, it is evident that under the MIS pattern the
increase over the five years in domestic value-added at domestic prices would
1
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have been 5.1percent greater than was planned with the FFYP allocation for
the same total investment. At international prices the differential increase in
value-added would have been considerably larger: 26.8 per cent. The differ-
ences in the implied average annual rates of growth of manufacturing were
relatively small at domestic 1961 prices, but much greater at international
prices. Thus the FFYP planned for an average annual manufacturing growth
rate of 13 per cent, valued at domestic prices, while the MIS investment
strategy would have resulted in an average annual rate of 13.8 per cent at
those prices. Measured at international prices, however, the planned growth
rate would come to 10.5 per cent per annum, whereas the MIS allocation
would have yielded 12.5 per cent per annum.
The differences between the planned growth and the hypothetical results
from the BEPIM strategy are much greater, both at domestic and at interna-
tional prices. Figured at domestic 1961 prices the increase in manufacturing
value-added over the five years would have been 56 per cent more under the
BEPIM pattern than that indicated by the FFYP allocation for the same level
of total investment in manufacturing. This would have implied an average
annual growth rate of 16.9 per cent under the BEPIM pattern, contrasted
with the planned rate of 13 per cent. The difference would have been greater
yet at international prices; value-added according to the BEPIM allocation
would have grown at an average annual rate of 17 per cent, contrasted with
the planned 10.5 per cent rate, as the increment over the five years would
have risen to 82 per cent more under the BEPIM allocation.
Before evaluating the behavior of individual sectors, it is worthwhile to
examine the results of similar computations for the SFYP, given in Table IX-
S. The results are much the same: an MIS pattern of investment over the
period would have resulted in a 9 per cent greater increase in output at
domestic prices and an 18 per cent greater increase in output at international
prices. Far bigger gains would have accrued to the BEPIM investment strate-
gy, as value-added could have grown by 46.5 per cent more at domestic prices
and by 63.1 per cent more at international prices than under the planned
allocation.
The implied average annual rates of growth of manufacturing value-added





As in the FFYP, the BEPIM investment pattern would have resulted in con-
siderably faster growth of manufacturing value-added than the MIS strategy,
which in turn would have resulted in a higher rate of growth than the planned
rate.
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The alternative strategies would therefore have resulted in considerably
lower ICORs for the manufacturing sector.9 The implied ICORs in the two
Plans under each strategy are:
MIS
The potential gains from alternative strategies appear slightly greater in the
FFYP than in the SFYP period. The reason for this is that the base-year
weights in the SFYP already reflected the past import-substitution efforts.
Even the BEPIM strategy in the SFYP period would have resulted in a heavier
weight to import-substitution sectors than in the FFYP. Neither hypothetical
alternative of course is an optimizing one, and bigger gains would be reflected
in an optimizing model than in either alternative evaluated here. Nonetheless,
the differences in manufacturing growth rates are considerable, and imply
that the costs of import-substitution may have been a loss on the order of 5
or 6 per cent per annum in the rate of growth of manufacturing value-added.
Given the downward bias in the estimates, the results are sufficient to indi-
cate that Turkish manufacturing could have grown considerably faster under
an alternative allocation strategy than in fact occurred.
Inspection of the behavior of individual sectors in Tables IX-3 to IX-5
suggests that a few sectors account for the major part of the differences.
Investment in chemicals as an import-substitution sector was heavily empha-
sized in both Plans. Chemicals are highly capital-intensive, and their ratio of
value-added at international prices to value-added at domestic prices is low. A
shift from chemicals to less capital-intensive sectors would have increased
manufacturing value-added even at Turkish prices, and still more at interna-
tional prices. Other sectors heavily emphasized in the Plans were paper and
steel. Their characteristics are similar to chemicals, with high capital intensi-
ties and low ratios of value-added at international prices to value-added at
domestic prices. Most of the gains in output reflected in the computations
could have been obtained by shifts out of those sectors.
Textiles, food products and metal products all appear to have reasonably
low ICORs and relatively high ratios of value-added at international prices to
value-added at domestic prices. Increased investment allocations to those sec-
tors would have implied a faster growth rate.
Despite the very large size of the potential gains, the results may be ques-
tioned on the grounds that Turkey could not have absorbed or marketed
9. Note that the ICORs are well below those given in Table IX-l. The main reason is that
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abroad such large increases in output of food, textiles, and tobacco. For
tobacco, the contention is undoubtedly valid. For food and textiles, there
probably would have been ample export markets with reasonable pricing
policies and a realistic exchange rate. For the implied growth of output in
food and textiles is less than 20 per cent per annum even under BEPIM, and
with Turkey's negligible share of world markets, rapid increases in exports
should have been feasible. For the five years of the SFYP, the increment in
value-added at international prices in food and textiles between the Plan
investments and the BEPIM patterns was IL 1,627 and TL 1,566 million,
respectively, or $181 million and million. Although the growth rate of
these exports would have been very high, their absolute values would not
have been. Achievement of even these modest targets would have required
access to markets. But Turkey's ties with the European Common Market and
her proximity to the Middle Eastern countries put her in an excellent position
in this regard.
It is of interest to test the sensitivity of the results to the role of textiles,
food, and tobacco. To do this, the author posited a constraint on tobacco
investment to its actual level in the SFYP, and constrained investment in
textiles and food to only 10 per cent above Plan levels. The author then
visually picked off an investment strategy, based upon ICORs, which would
entail the same level of investment.' 0 The result was an increase of TL
17,486 million in value-added at domestic prices and of TL 12,157 million in
value-added at international prices, which is much closer to the BEPIM results
than to the MIS. The interested reader can verify that elimination of TL
2,500 million investment in iron and steel and its reallocation would substan-
tially increase the gains.
Import requirements under alternative allocations
It is evident that an investment strategy aimed at BEPIM could have result-
ed in a considerably higher rate of growth of manufacturing output. Given
appropriate marketing efforts and incentives, the increment in international
value-added could have resulted in a sizeable increase in manufactured ex-
ports, which in itself would have alleviated Turkey's foreign exchange diffi-
culties by expanding Turkey's manufactured-export earnings. Such a strategy
would have implied that the export sector would have become a leading-
growth sector.
The import-substitution strategy also raised requirements of imports, both
10. The investment levels used, in the same order of sectors as given in Table IX-5 were
(TL million): 2035, 320, 190, 2640, 1400, 300, 200, 750, 850, 200, 500, 1150, 600,
1430, 700, 700, 2500, 100, 4500, 1800, 400, 500, 200, 55, 53, and 12.262 Macroeconomic Effects of the Trade Regime
on capital goods account and for intermediate goods, above the levels that
would have been required by either alternative strategy. Turkish planners
regarded the economy's capacity to invest as limited by foreign exchange. As
stated in the SFYP,
...one of the main structural impediments to economic growth in the past was the
fact that the foreign trade sector.. .could not keep up with the general economic
development.. .When development and industrialization accelerate, the ability to in-
crease the import capacity will be a very important factor in determining the growth
rate...
Chapter VI demonstrated how import demand for raw materials and inter-
mediate goods generally exceeded the Plan estimates, with the result that
capital goods imports were generally held to levels below those anticipated in
the Plans. To the extent that foreign exchange did constitute a binding con-
straint upon the rate of investment it is of interest to calculate the imports
that would have been required under an alternative investment strategy.
To do this, the import coefficients given in Table IX-2 were utilized to
estimate what the incremental import requirements, both for capital goods
and for intermediate goods, would have been under planned and hypothetical
strategies. The results are given in Table IX-6.
For intermediate goods imports, MIS would have required 36 per cent less
imports of intermediate goods, at 1963 coefficients, in the FFYP and 22 per
cent less imports in the SFYP than the actual allocation. A BEPIM strategy
would have required 26 per cent less intermediate goods imports in the FFYP
and 6 per cent fewer imports in the SFYP than the planned strategy, although
more imports would have been required than under MIS. When it is recalled
11. SFYP,op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I), pp. 47—8.
Table IX-6
Import requirements under alternative growth strategies (millions of TL)
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that manufacturing output andvalue-addedgrow much faster under BEPIM
than under MIS, itis clear why import requirements are under the
fIrst than under the second. What is surprising is that increments of 82 per
cent and 63 per cent, respectively, in value-added over the planned levels in the
two Plans could have been sustained with a reduction in total intermediate
goods imports.
For capital goods the picture is similar. A BEPIM pattern would have
utilized 24 per cent fewer imports than the actual investment pattern during the
FFYP, and 12 per cent fewer during the SFYP. This result is the more
striking because of the relatively high import content of investment in textiles
(see Table IX.2).
If foreign exchange availability was the binding constraint on the level of
investment, these results would imply that investment could have been in-
creased by about 50 per cent during the FFYP, with no change in the level of
imports when both intermediate goods and capital goods import requirements
are taken into account. In the SFYP, investment could have increased by
about 30 per cent with no change in imports.
Thus the import-substitution strategy actually pursued was import-inten-
sive, at least over the period of the FFYP and SFYP. In every sense therefore
BEPIM strategy would have dominated: with the same level of investment,
manufacturing growth could have proceeded at an average annual rate about
6 per cent above that planned, valued at international prices. If in addition
investment in manufacturing had been increased by 25 per cent with an
export.oriented strategy, the rate of growth of manufacturing value.added
could have been doubled, with no change in total import requirements above
the levels foreseen in the Plans. With additional output from export-oriented
sectors, moreover, foreign exchange earnings could have increased substan-
tially, permitting larger imports.
Employment effects of alternative strategies
Table IX-7 gives estimates of new jobs created under each investment allo-
cation for the two Plans. MIS would have resulted in about 37,000 more jobs
in the FFYP and 93,000 more jobs in the SFYP than the actual investment
pattern. BEPIM would have created 70 per cent more new jobs, or 138
thousand more than the actual strategy in the FFYP and 50 per cent more (or
over 200,000) than that of the SFYP.
Viewed against a non-agricultural labor force of about 3.7 million and
implied urban unemployment of 462,000 in 1965,1 2theadditional employ-
ment potential of the BEPIM strategy is impressive.
12.Ibid., p. 149; and Census of Population, 1965.
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Table IX-7
New jobs created by alternative investment patterns (thousands of jobs)
Sector
FFYP SFYP














Textiles and clothing 39.3 87.1 136.8 93.6 137.4 197.6













Rubber 16.1 4.3 8.3 16.3 22.0 15.7
Chemicals 14.3 9.2 2.8 46.0 21.6 14.1






































































Total 197.1 233.8 335.3428.0520.9 640.4
Source:Data from Tables lX-2 to IX-4.
Since investment is assumed to be the same under each strategy, the labor-
capital ratio would have increased in the same proportion as the increase in
the number of new jobs.
All computations thus indicate that Turkey's trade regime and the asso-
ciated import-substitution strategy had considerable growth-rate costs over
the period of the two Five Year Plans. To the extent that foreign exchange
was a binding constraint, the import-substitution strategy made it more so,
and if investment was limited by foreign-exchange availability, investment
could have been substantially increased by a different strategy. Even withinonomic Effects of the Trade Regime
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ferent strategy. Evenwithin
the planned investment level the rate of growth of manufacturing value-added
could have been increased by about one-third and efnployment opportunities
could have grown even more.
The data are of course indicative only of orders of magnitude, and the
alternatives considered are not optimizing ones. There were undoubtedly sub-
sectors within each sector which would have been included in an optimal
strategy. Given the downward biases inherent in the data, there can be little
doubt that the growth-rate cost of the strategy was high. The alternative
export-oriented strategy would have requireda considerable change in
Turkey's economic orientation, but that change would have been in line with
Turkey's stated intent to enter the Common Market as well as with its objec-
tive of a more dynamic and progressive industrial sector. An export-oriented
strategy would not have been confined to textiles, metal products and food
products but could have permeated each industrial sector. There is thus every
reason to believe that the static losses associated with import-substitution
discussed in Chapter VIII were fully reflected in Turkey's growth rate during
the 1960's.